/usr/share/pyshared/rdiff_backup/Security.py is in rdiff-backup 1.2.8-7.
This file is owned by root:root, with mode 0o644.
The actual contents of the file can be viewed below.
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#
# This file is part of rdiff-backup.
#
# rdiff-backup is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
# Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
# option) any later version.
#
# rdiff-backup is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
# General Public License for more details.
#
# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
# along with rdiff-backup; if not, write to the Free Software
# Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
# USA
"""Functions to make sure remote requests are kosher"""
import sys, tempfile, types
import Globals, Main, rpath, log
class Violation(Exception):
"""Exception that indicates an improper request has been received"""
pass
# This will store the list of functions that will be honored from
# remote connections.
allowed_requests = None
# This stores the list of global variables that the client can not
# set on the server.
disallowed_server_globals = ["server", "security_level", "restrict_path"]
# Some common file commands we may want to check to make sure they are
# in the right directory. Any commands accessing files that could be
# added to allowed_requests must be here.
#
# The keys are files request, the value is the index of the argument
# taking a file.
file_requests = {'os.listdir':0, 'rpath.make_file_dict':0, 'os.chmod':0,
'os.chown':0, 'os.remove':0, 'os.removedirs':0,
'os.rename':0, 'os.renames':0, 'os.rmdir':0, 'os.unlink':0,
'os.utime':0, 'os.lchown':0, 'os.link':1, 'os.symlink':1,
'os.mkdir':0, 'os.makedirs':0,
'rpath.delete_dir_no_files':0}
def initialize(action, cmdpairs):
"""Initialize allowable request list and chroot"""
global allowed_requests
set_security_level(action, cmdpairs)
set_allowed_requests(Globals.security_level)
def reset_restrict_path(rp):
"""Reset restrict path to be within rpath"""
assert rp.conn is Globals.local_connection
Globals.restrict_path = rp.normalize().path
def set_security_level(action, cmdpairs):
"""If running client, set security level and restrict_path
To find these settings, we must look at the action to see what is
supposed to happen, and then look at the cmdpairs to see what end
the client is on.
"""
def islocal(cmdpair): return not cmdpair[0]
def bothlocal(cp1, cp2): return islocal(cp1) and islocal(cp2)
def bothremote(cp1, cp2): return not islocal(cp1) and not islocal(cp2)
def getpath(cmdpair): return cmdpair[1]
if Globals.server: return
cp1 = cmdpairs[0]
if len(cmdpairs) > 1: cp2 = cmdpairs[1]
else: cp2 = cp1
if action == "backup" or action == "check-destination-dir":
if bothlocal(cp1, cp2) or bothremote(cp1, cp2):
sec_level = "minimal"
rdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
elif islocal(cp1):
sec_level = "read-only"
rdir = getpath(cp1)
else:
assert islocal(cp2)
sec_level = "update-only"
rdir = getpath(cp2)
elif action == "restore" or action == "restore-as-of":
if len(cmdpairs) == 1 or bothlocal(cp1, cp2) or bothremote(cp1, cp2):
sec_level = "minimal"
rdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
elif islocal(cp1):
sec_level = "read-only"
Main.restore_set_root(rpath.RPath(Globals.local_connection,
getpath(cp1)))
if Main.restore_root: rdir = Main.restore_root.path
else: log.Log.FatalError("Invalid restore directory")
else:
assert islocal(cp2)
sec_level = "all"
rdir = getpath(cp2)
elif action == "mirror":
if bothlocal(cp1, cp2) or bothremote(cp1, cp2):
sec_level = "minimal"
rdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
elif islocal(cp1):
sec_level = "read-only"
rdir = getpath(cp1)
else:
assert islocal(cp2)
sec_level = "all"
rdir = getpath(cp2)
elif action in ["test-server", "list-increments", 'list-increment-sizes',
"list-at-time", "list-changed-since",
"calculate-average", "remove-older-than", "compare",
"compare-hash", "compare-full", "verify"]:
sec_level = "minimal"
rdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
else: assert 0, "Unknown action %s" % action
Globals.security_level = sec_level
Globals.restrict_path = rpath.RPath(Globals.local_connection,
rdir).normalize().path
def set_allowed_requests(sec_level):
"""Set the allowed requests list using the security level"""
global allowed_requests
l = ["VirtualFile.readfromid", "VirtualFile.closebyid",
"Globals.get", "Globals.is_not_None", "Globals.get_dict_val",
"log.Log.open_logfile_allconn", "log.Log.close_logfile_allconn",
"Log.log_to_file", "FilenameMapping.set_init_quote_vals_local",
"FilenameMapping.set_init_quote_vals",
"SetConnections.add_redirected_conn", "RedirectedRun",
"sys.stdout.write", "robust.install_signal_handlers"]
if (sec_level == "read-only" or sec_level == "update-only" or
sec_level == "all"):
l.extend(["rpath.make_file_dict", "os.listdir", "rpath.ea_get",
"rpath.acl_get", "rpath.setdata_local",
"log.Log.log_to_file", "os.getuid", "Time.setcurtime_local",
"rpath.gzip_open_local_read", "rpath.open_local_read",
"Hardlink.initialize_dictionaries", "user_group.uid2uname",
"user_group.gid2gname"])
if sec_level == "read-only" or sec_level == "all":
l.extend(["fs_abilities.get_readonly_fsa",
"restore.MirrorStruct.get_increment_times",
"restore.MirrorStruct.set_mirror_and_rest_times",
"restore.MirrorStruct.set_mirror_select",
"restore.MirrorStruct.initialize_rf_cache",
"restore.MirrorStruct.close_rf_cache",
"restore.MirrorStruct.get_diffs",
"restore.ListChangedSince",
"restore.ListAtTime",
"backup.SourceStruct.get_source_select",
"backup.SourceStruct.set_source_select",
"backup.SourceStruct.get_diffs",
"compare.RepoSide.init_and_get_iter",
"compare.RepoSide.close_rf_cache",
"compare.RepoSide.attach_files",
"compare.DataSide.get_source_select",
"compare.DataSide.compare_fast",
"compare.DataSide.compare_hash",
"compare.DataSide.compare_full",
"compare.Verify"])
if sec_level == "update-only" or sec_level == "all":
l.extend(["log.Log.open_logfile_local", "log.Log.close_logfile_local",
"log.ErrorLog.open", "log.ErrorLog.isopen",
"log.ErrorLog.close",
"backup.DestinationStruct.set_rorp_cache",
"backup.DestinationStruct.get_sigs",
"backup.DestinationStruct.patch_and_increment",
"Main.backup_touch_curmirror_local",
"Main.backup_remove_curmirror_local",
"regress.check_pids",
"Globals.ITRB.increment_stat",
"statistics.record_error",
"log.ErrorLog.write_if_open",
"fs_abilities.backup_set_globals"])
if sec_level == "all":
l.extend(["os.mkdir", "os.chown", "os.lchown", "os.rename",
"os.unlink", "os.remove", "os.chmod", "os.makedirs",
"rpath.delete_dir_no_files",
"backup.DestinationStruct.patch",
"restore.TargetStruct.get_initial_iter",
"restore.TargetStruct.patch",
"restore.TargetStruct.set_target_select",
"fs_abilities.restore_set_globals",
"fs_abilities.single_set_globals",
"regress.Regress", "manage.delete_earlier_than_local"])
if Globals.server:
l.extend(["SetConnections.init_connection_remote",
"log.Log.setverbosity", "log.Log.setterm_verbosity",
"Time.setprevtime_local", "Globals.postset_regexp_local",
"Globals.set_select", "backup.SourceStruct.set_session_info",
"backup.DestinationStruct.set_session_info",
"user_group.init_user_mapping",
"user_group.init_group_mapping"])
allowed_requests = {}
for req in l: allowed_requests[req] = None
def raise_violation(request, arglist):
"""Raise a security violation about given request"""
raise Violation("\nWarning Security Violation!\n"
"Bad request for function: %s\n"
"with arguments: %s\n" % (request.function_string,
arglist))
def vet_request(request, arglist):
"""Examine request for security violations"""
#if Globals.server: sys.stderr.write(str(request) + "\n")
security_level = Globals.security_level
if security_level == "override": return
if Globals.restrict_path:
for arg in arglist:
if isinstance(arg, rpath.RPath): vet_rpath(arg)
if request.function_string in file_requests:
vet_filename(request, arglist)
if request.function_string in allowed_requests: return
if request.function_string in ("Globals.set", "Globals.set_local"):
if arglist[0] not in disallowed_server_globals: return
raise_violation(request, arglist)
def vet_rpath(rpath):
"""Require rpath not to step outside retricted directory"""
if Globals.restrict_path and rpath.conn is Globals.local_connection:
normalized, restrict = rpath.normalize().path, Globals.restrict_path
if restrict == "/": return
components = normalized.split("/")
# 3 cases for restricted dir /usr/foo: /var, /usr/foobar, /usr/foo/..
if (not normalized.startswith(restrict) or
(len(normalized) > len(restrict) and
normalized[len(restrict)] != "/") or
".." in components):
raise Violation("\nWarning Security Violation!\n"
"Request to handle path %s\n"
"which doesn't appear to be within "
"restrict path %s.\n" % (normalized, restrict))
def vet_filename(request, arglist):
"""Check to see if file operation is within the restrict_path"""
i = file_requests[request.function_string]
if len(arglist) <= i: raise_violation(request, arglist)
filename = arglist[i]
if type(filename) is not types.StringType:
raise_violation(request, arglist)
vet_rpath(rpath.RPath(Globals.local_connection, filename))
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